FREEDOM - for whom?

David Purdy gives us something to think about

The concept of freedom is contested. For classical liberals, freedom is the supreme social value and is defined in terms of non-interference: I am free to the extent that others – whether individuals, private organisations or public agencies – leave me alone to work out my own salvation. Taken together with the liberal commitment to (limited) equality, this implies that the proper role of government is to secure the maximum liberty for each, compatible with equal liberty for all. Thus, the state must enforce the rule of law, establish and maintain a competitive market economy and protect legitimately acquired property rights. It must also guarantee basic civil liberties: of worship, conscience, thought, expression, movement, assembly and association.

Notice that nothing about this essentially negative conception entails a commitment to democracy, representative or otherwise. It was not until the nineteenth century that liberal thinkers like Bentham and Mill began to advocate parliamentary reform. And by the mid-twentieth century, only thirty years after the achievement of universal adult suffrage, neo-liberals like Hayek and Friedman had become distinctly uneasy about democracy. They still preferred it to any form of authoritarian rule, but were alarmed by the tendency of elected governments to accede to popular pressure by usurping market forces and proposed various technical fixes to depoliticise certain issues or limit government discretion. Their advice has been widely heeded, particularly in matters of money and finance. National governments have surrendered control over currency exchange rates and cross-border capital flows; responsibility for setting interest rates has been transferred to ‘independent’ committees of experts; and stringent rules have been imposed on public spending and borrowing.

Socialists favour a positive conception of freedom, arguing that people are free to the extent that they have the opportunities, resources, capabilities and time to think for themselves, make their own choices and shape their own lives in accordance with their most deeply cherished values and beliefs. Moreover, since human beings are not atomised individuals, but social animals who live together in political communities, the ideal of personal autonomy can only be realised in self-governing societies where democratic institutions extend to all collective activities, including – notably – the production of goods and services – and are not confined to voluntary associations and periodic elections to decide which party or coalition should form the government.


Political traditions

Political traditions are not the same as political parties. Consider the history of British liberalism. For forty years after the repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846, the Liberal party was the natural party of government. It stood for political liberty, economic progress and social reform and was backed by a broad alliance stretching from Whig grandees and captains of industry to radical democrats and working men. The party suffered a heavy blow in 1886 when the Liberal Unionists defected to the Conservatives after Gladstone came out in support of Irish home rule: apart from a brief interlude from 1892 to 1895, it was out of office for the next twenty years. But it eventually recovered to win a landslide victory at the